How do City and Liverpool 2021/22 compare to Manchester United 1998/99?

You may have seen several articles over the past few weeks from the likes of Jamie Carragher calling Manchester City vs Liverpool “the greatest rivalry ever in English football”. This oft-repeated piece of recency bias seemed to hinge on the fact that never before had two teams been both at the top of English and European football at the same time.

Except in 2007/08 when Manchester United and Chelsea battled for the Premier League title until the last day with the Red Devils winning the league by 2 points. That same season they contested the first all-English Champions League final in Moscow.

In fact between 2004 and 2011 in terms of English champions it went: Chelsea, Chelsea, Manchester United, Manchester United, Manchester United, Chelsea, Manchester United. There was the aforementioned all-English Champions League final in 2008. And further Champions League final appearances for United in 2009 and 2011 before Chelsea finally won it in 2012.

Or in 1978/79 when defending European champions Liverpool faced English champions Nottingham Forest in the first round of the European Cup. Forest won 2–0 on aggregate and went on to become European champions themselves. Liverpool would win the Division One title that season, two points above…Nottingham Forest. In 1979/80 Liverpool would retain their Division One title whilst Nottingham Forest would hold onto their European title.

An unprecedented rivalry? Jürgen Klopp and Pep Guardiola have been in the Premier League together for six seasons now. In that time City has won three league titles, one FA Cup and four League Cups. Liverpool has one title, one League Cup and one Champions League.

In the six years between 1998 and 2004 Arsène Wenger’s Arsenal won three league titles and three FA Cups. Manchester United also won three titles, two FA Cups and the Champions League. There was an unbeaten league season for Arsenal in 2003/04 and the Treble for United in 1998/99. United knocked Arsenal out of the FA Cup in 1999, Arsenal knocked United out in 2003 before United knocked them out in 2004. That’s even before Pizzagate. That was a rivalry and one which helped to define the Premier League as it is today.

Unprecedented? Only if you don’t know your history.

Anyway, now that I’ve got that grumble off my chest all the talk of Manchester City and Liverpool possibly winning a treble or quadruple this season has got me thinking: As a United fan with only the end of the season to look forward to, how does the treble campaign of 1998/99 compare to City and Liverpool this season? 

City turn draws to wins

Manchester City are top of the Premier League by one point having played 31 matches. In 1998/99 Manchester United were also top of the Premiership by one point after 31 matches.

But City have ten more points (74) than United had City (64). Where has this gap come from?

City have lost the same number of matches as United: 3. And they have scored just three more goals than United had: 72 for City, 69 for United. Yet City have a far better defensive record conceding 12 goals fewer (20) than United had in 1999 (32). This has translated not in losing less than United did in 1998/99 but into turning draws into wins. United had won 18 and drawn 10. City have won 23 and drawn 5. Those five extra wins are where their ten extra points have come from. Nine of their wins have been by a single goal. At the same point in 1998/99 just five of United’s wins had been by a single goal. This speaks a lot to the style of football that Guardiola and Klopp have brought to England. Not at all about jeopardy or drama but of mechanical precision and eliminating risk. The ‘football bloody hell’ of United’s treble season would be an anathema to Guardiola. This might be why United’s 1998/99 is littered with iconic moments yet it would be hard to name one from either City’s or Liverpool’s seasons.

A worse league?

In 1998/99 United finished top with 79 points and only 3 defeats, then a Premiership record low for defeats. Next was Arsenal with 78 points. Third was Chelsea, only 4 points behind United on 75.

In the final 2021/22 Premier League table as predicted by FiveThirtyEight Chelsea are on course to finish third with 79 points, four more than in 1999 but twelve points behind City in first. Tottenham Hotspur is predicted to finish fourth with 67 points, the same as Leeds United in 1999 (although only the top two made the Champions League then). Leeds were twelve points off top in 1999, Spurs are predicted to be twenty-two points off the top in 2022.

So while in 1998/99 there was a genuine three-way fight for the title (plus a nascent challenge by Aston Villa earlier in the season) the general trend in recent seasons has a huge gap between first and third and first and fourth. Great for Manchester City and Liverpool but isn’t this ‘2 plus the rest’ style of league exactly what we used to criticise La Liga and the SPL for?

Since the top four first qualified for the Champions League in 2001/02 67 points has been good enough to make fourth on three previous occasions, including last season for Chelsea. In 13 previous seasons the team finishing fourth managed to win more than 67 points; in 2013/14 Arsenal finished fourth with 79 points, 67 points would have been good enough to finish 7th. Only in four previous seasons has the team finishing fourth won fewer than 67 points. In fact, since 2017 the trend has been generally going down: 76 points in 2017, 75 in 2018, 71 in 2019, 66 in 2020, 67 in 2021 and now 67 predicted for 2022. It says a lot that Manchester United could still finish fourth this season.

Of course, this system entirely suits the clubs. Look at the last two English clubs to win the Champions League. Liverpool finished fourth in 2018, 25 points off City in first. The next season Liverpool won the Champions League. Chelsea finished fourth in 2020, 33 points off Liverpool in first. Chelsea won the Champions League in 2021. So expect the ‘two plus the rest’ to remain for the foreseeable.

What of the bottom of the Premier League? Both Norwich City and Watford are predicted to be relegated with fewer points than Nottingham Forest, bottom-placed in 1998/99. Everton are forecast to stay up with 36 points in 17th place. Leeds are predicted to make 16th with 38 points. In 1999 Southampton finished 17th with 41 points: both Everton and Leeds would be relegated.

Manchester United have had three managers, caretaker, interim and otherwise, this season. Tottenham Hotspur are on their fourth manager in two years. Chelsea have changed managers four times since Pep Guardiola joined City. Mikel Arteta has been manager of Arsenal for three years yet is still stuck on ‘promising’ mode rather than showing any tangible evidence of a master plan. Manchester City and Liverpool have had consistency on their side and administrators who work to fit the football side, not the other way round. It helps to have money and both clubs have been very free spenders. But they have taken advantage of their ‘rivals’ having regular existential crises.

Not all cup runs are equal

In the 1998–99 FA Cup United played Middlesborough (at the time they played 5 league places below them), Liverpool (3 league places below them), Fulham (45 league places below them and Chelsea (1 league place below them). That’s 3 Premiership teams and one in Division Two.

Liverpool have made the 2022 semi-final having played Shrewsbury Town (55 league places below), Cardiff City (38 league places below), Norwich City (18 league places below) and Nottingham Forest (27 league places below). That’s one Premier League team (the bottom team), two in the Championship and one in League One.

Manchester City have played Swindon Town (72 league places below), Fulham (20 league places below), Peterborough Town (43 league places below) and Southampton (10 league places below). That’s one Premier League team, two from the Championship and one in League Two.

That means that United reached the 1999 FA Cup semi-final having played teams an average of 13.5 league places below them (it’s an average of 3 league places below them if the huge outlier Fulham is removed).

Manchester City has reached the semi-final having played teams an average of 36.25 league places below them. Liverpool has played teams an average of 34.5 league places below them.

Not all cup runs are equal. Some aren’t even close.

Champions League semis are par for City and Liverpool

In 1998/99 Manchester United found themselves in Group D with Bayern Munich, Rivaldo’s Barcelona and Brondby. 20 goals later they emerged unbeaten and were rewarded with a tie against an Inter Milan side containing Baggio, Zanetti, Zamorano, Ronaldo (the original) and Simeone. Having negotiated that along came Juventus in their full 90s pomp: Del Piero, Deschamps, Zidane, Davids et al. Then Bayern again in Barcelona. As Clive Tyldesley put it: “Goodbye Rivaldo. Goodbye Ronaldo. Goodbye Zidane. Hello Matthäus.”

UEFA seedings are determined by club coefficients. These are based on the results of clubs competing in the five previous seasons of the UEFA Champions League, UEFA Europa League and UEFA Europa Conference League. They are usually determined by the sum of all points won in the previous five years.

In 1998/99 Manchester United faced only one team with a lower coefficient than them: Brondby IF. Yet they went unbeaten, scoring in every game and beating every team at least once apart from Barcelona against whom they played out two 3–3 classics.

In 2021/22 Manchester City (130 points) and Liverpool (127) were the second and third seeds respectively. Only Bayern Munich were above them.

Manchester City were placed in a group with PSG (112 points), RB Leipzig (78 points) and Club Brugge (38.5 points). They lost twice, once to PSG and once to Leipzig. 

Liverpool got an AC Milan side making their first Champions League appearance in 7 years (38 points), Porto (80 points) and an underperforming Atletico Madrid (104 points). 

In the next round City were drawn with Sporting CP (55.5 points). Liverpool got an Inter Milan far removed from their 1999 vintage (79.814 points) and scraped through. City then faced Atleti and Liverpool faced Benfica (60 points). For the semi-finals City will play Real Madrid (118 points) while Liverpool face Villareal CF (76 points). If we’re being honest, the semi-finals would represent par for City and Liverpool. 

Some of this is due to English football’s rise and commercial power. In the 90s English football lagged behind other leagues, especially Serie A. United’s triumph in Barcelona was the first for an English team in 15 years. Since 1999 there have been five English winners and three all-English finals. Interestingly though, only one of those winners (Manchester United in 2008) won the Champions League as English champions.  


It is not the fault of City or Liverpool that due to the expansion of the Champions League they find themselves playing more and more worse teams. But it does put their achievements into perspective. They should make the semi-finals based on their seedings. In 1998/99 six other teams in the Champions League had a higher coefficient than United.

* * *

Whatever City and Liverpool win this season will be an amazing achievement. But if treble or quadruples are won perhaps it will only further highlight the differences between now and 23 years ago. United were no angels in 1998/99 but nor did Amnesty International have their own report on their ownership as they do with City’s. And Liverpool’s owners were just as complicit in the European Super League plan. And ask ask Liverpool Women or the staff they tried to furlough with tax-payer money if Fenway Sports are true to Bill Shankly’s values. 

As depressing as this season has been for a United fan it’s not half as depressing as looking back at 1998/99. When the Champions League was just that and not there to be won by the team who finished fourth in the league. When no football club was sponsored by a gambling or cryptocurrency company. And no club was being faced with EU sanctions. 

It really doesn’t compare.

This season was an opportunity for Marcus Rashford which has slipped away

Wayne Rooney was blunt.

“What I hope is that Marcus Rashford f***ing gets his head out of his a*** and goes and breaks that record. He is a Manchester lad.”

Yet the idea that Rashford might stay at Manchester United to take Rooney’s status as record goalscorer is seeming less and less likely. His meteoric rise from a surprise starter against FC Midtjylland in 2016 to borderline national treasure has stalled. It did not have to be this way.

Wembley Stadium. London. 11th July 2021. England vs Italy in the final of Euro 2020. It’s 2–2 on penalties and Marcus Rashford stepped up to take England’s third and put them 3–2 up. His slow run-up sends Gianluigi Donnarumma the wrong way. Yet the ball agonisingly slowly clips the Italian’s right-hand post and ricochets away. Rashford, brought on bizarrely late specifically to take this penalty, holds his head in his hands. You know the rest.

For what it’s worth Rashford’s penalty was not that bad. His technique was much the same as that used 47 days earlier in the Europa League final in Gdansk when he sent Gerónimo Rulli of Villareal the wrong way for Manchester United. Then his kick hit the back of the net, although he still ended up on the losing side.

The fact was, however, that Rashford’s miss against Italy capped a personally disappointing campaign. He played just 84 minutes of England’s journey to the final. He had no shots, no assists and no goals.

Yet, as he dusted himself off Rashford could have looked back at Euro 2020 and forward to Qatar 2022 and seen an opportunity. One of the key lessons from England’s Euro campaign was their reliance on Harry Kane and Raheem Sterling. Only John Stones (679) and Kalvin Phillips (665) played more minutes than Kane (649) and Sterling (641) at Euro 2020. The forwards had the most shots and highest expected goals ratings of any England player with Maguire and Mount coming distant thirds respectively.

Kane and Sterling were not just at the end of movements; they also involved themselves in passing sequences. In total Sterling was involved in 24 passing sequences which finished with a shot and 6 which finished with a goal. Kane was involved in 21 sequences that ended with a shot and 7 which ended with a goal. The total expected goals for movements (total expected goal value of unique open play shot or goal-ending sequences that a player was involved in) involving Sterling was 7.08 and 6.38 for those involving Kane. Kalvin Phillips was a distant third.

However, against Italy neither Kane nor Sterling managed a single shot. By controlling Kane and Sterling Italy was able to nullify most of England’s threat. With the next World Cup coming mid-season the need for a deep squad and alternatives is obvious. Rashford, or at least someone near him, could easily see that this season was his opportunity to push for a spot in Southgate’s plans either alongside Kane and Sterling or as a ready-made alternative to either. Rashford has the ability as both a centre forward or to play from either side. The spot was there for the taking. Get your head down and make it yours.

Yet, in the most recent England squad, Rashford was not called up. Instead, Ollie Watkins of Aston Villa was there, scoring and staking a claim. According to Gareth Southgate, it had been between Watkins or Patrick Bamford for the spot. No mention of Marcus Rashford.

The thing is Rashford hasn’t even made the decision hard for Southgate. He’s played just 974 minutes of football in the league this season, scoring 4 goals and making 2. Fourteen of his United teammates have played more minutes. Neither Kane nor Sterling has had a vintage season yet their numbers dwarf Rashford’s. Kane has played 2509 minutes in the league, scoring 12 and making 6. Sterling has 1651 minutes, 10 goals and 3 assists. Even Mason Greenwood, suspended since 30th January, has more minutes (1305) and goals (5) than Rashford.

It’s hard not to see this as a situation slipping away from Rashford. His last competitive start for England was on 14th October 2020. His last competitive international goal was on 11th October 2020. Recent history is full of promising England forwards who faded without a trace from the international scene: Daniel Sturridge, Danny Welbeck and Theo Walcott being three who spring to mind.

So what to make of reports he is looking for a move elsewhere? He certainly isn’t the only England player to struggle post-Euro 2020 nor is he the only United player who will want this season to have finished yesterday. Whoever replaces Ralf Rangnick will be Rashford’s sixth manager at Old Trafford (including caretakers and interims); one for every year since his debut. It is entirely reasonable for him to look at the hierarchy at United and wonder if he’s best out of it (although why he’d look at PSG for sanity is baffling).

Yet look at who he’s had to work with since his debut. When he first appeared for United one of his fellow forwards was a certain Wayne Rooney, someone surely able to give a young English forward a few pointers. Then came Zlatan Ibrahimović. Then Edinson Cavani. Then Cristiano Ronaldo. For all the chaos at Old Trafford in terms of striking pedigree it’s hard to think of a club anywhere where a young forward could have had a better peer group.

It was an injury crisis involving thirteen players which saw Marcus Rashford included in the United squad to face FC Midtjylland. When Anthony Martial was injured in the warm-up Rashford was told to start. He grabbed the opportunity. Three days later he started against Arsenal in the league. He grabbed the opportunity. Roy Hodgson later gave him his England debut against Australia. He grabbed the opportunity. This is not a player used to not succeeding in his targets. Add in his MBE and the fact that as a black player he still has to face horrific abuse from troglodytes online and it is impossible not to be impressed by Marcus Rashford.

However, it is hard not to agree with Rooney’s assessment of Rashford. England will start their 2022 World Cup campaign on 21st November. Between now and then there are six Nations League matches to play which Southgate will use to plan. Rashford needs to get his head out of his a**e and make sure he gets back in those plans. The opportunities are running out.

Perfect storm of team selection and substitutions cost United against Villa

In a way, this is an analysis that is decided by the outcome. Bruno Fernandes, with 42 penalties scored and three missed, steps up against Emiliano Martínez who at that point had faced 24 penalties and conceded 18, including one from Fernandes earlier this year. It’s fair to say a goal was expected. United get a late point, Liverpool and Chelsea both drop points and it’s on to the next one

Except Bruno didn’t score. Instead of scoring number 43, he missed number 4. And after blazing his shot over United lost at home. A defeat rooted in team selection, injury and substitutions. 

Solskjaer named an unchanged side from the win over West Ham. That win featured cautious play with possession played mostly involving defenders. The decision to play ‘McFred’ against an Aston Villa side who were obviously going to try and sit deep was a cautious one. 

Was a double midfield pivot needed to protect a backline featuring a central partnership that cost United a combined £121 million and represent 120 senior international caps between them? And what was their contribution?

United had 65% possession and completed 313 passes to Villa’s 187. They ‘won’ the match on xG: 1.93 to 1.57. They had 28 shots to Villa’s 7. Yet when it came to shots on target United managed only 4 and Villa had 3. This was the classic smash-and-grab from Villa.

All of United’s shots on target were within the Villa box yet all were poor quality. Two were from Greenwood (xG of 0.10 and 0.09) one from Pogba ( xG of 0.03) and one from Maguire (xG 0.02). Ronaldo and Cavani, later brought on, managed one shot off target between them. United’s chance with the highest xG was Fernandes’s penalty (0.76). United were obviously going to dominate possession and so needed to create good quality chances. Had it not been for the penalty United’s xG for a match in which they had 65% possession and 28 shots would have been only 1.17.

‘McFred’ completed 54 passes between them. 27 went forward, which doesn’t seem too bad, but only 10 were in the final third. And as far as destroying goes, they managed only 4 tackles between them and 1 intervention. 

This also meant that, again, Pogba was played on the left of the attacking midfield three. In a previous blog I pointed out how Pogba had flourished playing deeper in midfield against Wolves and Newcastle United. Against Newcastle by himself he completed nearly double (106)  the total managed by ‘McFred’ against Villa. Playing Pogba further forward also completely negates one of his best weapons: precise long passes perfect for a pacey forward such as Greenwood, Sancho or a fit Rashford. Against Villa, Pogba had an expected assist of only 0.10 as opposed to 1.58 against Newcastle. 

Greenwood did attempt 7 take-ons against Villa but it’s common sense that two pacey wingers would have given the Villains more to think about.

The decision by the Premier League to revert back to three substitutions last season didn’t make sense and it still doesn’t. The repercussions were felt in this match. After picking a conservative starting line-up Solskjaer then had to ‘spend’ two of his three substitutions on defenders due to injuries: Dalot for Shaw and Lindelöf for Maguire. This decision meant that as United continued to dominate the match yet struggle to break Villa down Solskjaer had only one more substitution to win the game. 

In the 81st minute, he took off McTominey for Cavani. Cavani, like Ronaldo, is mostly a box-based forward. United, therefore, had two forwards sitting in the box yet no way of increasing their service. And in doing so Lingard, scorer of two goals in his previous two United appearances, and £166 million of investment in Sancho, van de Beek and Martial remained on the bench. Of course, rather than replacing Shaw and Maguire like for like Solskjaer could have brought on another midfielder and changed formation. All in all, Solskjaer’s changes lacked imagination.

It’s tempting to think that with five substitutions allowed two of those players would have been brought on. The amount of talent and expenditure Solskjaer isn’t turning to is piling up. To have van de Beek sitting on the bench is bad enough. To have Sancho there after all the hassle of his transfer would be a tragedy. 

As it was this wasn’t a ‘bad’ match to lose as Liverpool and Chelsea also dropped points. And, had Bruno scored, the narrative could have been of resilient United fighting to the end. As it was this was a defeat born out of the perfect storm of a poor team choice and a mixture of bad luck and lack of imagination when it came to substitutions. 

All statistics courtesy of Understat , the Manchester United smartphone app and TheStatZone

Lessons from West Ham away: the defence pass, Ronaldo the new Ruud and how good is de Gea?

The win against West Ham had it all: a come-from-behind win with a late winner and an even later penalty save from David de Gea.

What to make of Manchester United’s away record?

Sunday’s win over West Ham United has taken the Red Devils’ away record to 29 without defeat, all the way back to a 2-0 defeat at Anfield on 19th January 2020. As has been widely reported, this is an English league record overshadowing the Invincible Arsenal record of 27 away matches without defeat. Obviously, Arsenal’s record stands as one of English football’s shining examples. But what of United’s?

Played 29 Won 19 Drawn 10 Goals For 53 Goals Against 20 Points 67 (out of a possible 87)

The win on Sunday was the tenth comeback win in this record. Four of the drawn matches also involved coming from behind (interestingly all finished 1-1 with the latest being the away match against Southampton this season). That means that 14 out of the 29 matches (48%) have seen United concede first. It also means that 34 of the 67 points (51%) gained on this run involved coming from behind.

Comparing United’s away results and points this season …

Southampton 1 - 1 Manchester United

Wolverhampton Wanderers 0 - 1 Manchester United

West Ham United 1 - 2 Manchester United

Played 3 Won 2 Drawn 1 Lost 0 Goals For 4 Goals Against 2 Points 7

… to those based on expected goals (xG):

Southampton 0.59 - 2.28 Manchester United

Wolverhampton Wanderers 1.8 - 0.94 Manchester United

West Ham United 1.67 - 1.9 Manchester United

Played 3 Won 2 Drawn 0 Lost 1 Goals For 5.12 Goals Against 4.06 Points 6

United should have lost against Wolves but they should have beaten Southampton. In the end they are only outperforming their expected points by one away from home. In other words, they’re not really over-performing on the road so far this season. Clearly, having won more than half of their points coming on behind on this away run this can’t be a fluke. Something more is going on. Maybe it’s to do with how United set up away from home. In one word: deep.

Against West Ham Manchester United had 60% possession and completed 90% of their 624 passes. Impressive, but where United pass tells a story.

Of United’s top ten passing combinations against West Ham, three were between two defenders and one was between de Gea and Varane. This is definitely a pattern on the road. In their previous away match at Wolves six of United’s top ten (and four of their top five!) passing combinations were between two defenders. In their last home match, however, against Newcastle, only one of United’s top ten passing combinations was between two defenders. For all of the drama, United are very cautious on the road and liable to get pinned back against their own box with a lot of possession going to their defenders. Even the way they conceded, with a deflection off Varane, was similar to the way they went behind against Southampton.

For all of the possession, United’s attacking midfield three were somewhat blunt as well. Despite Pogba’s recent successes playing in the midfield base, here he was back on the left of a three with Fernandes and Greenwood. It wasn’t a match where any of them really showed his best. Of Pogba’s 57 successful passes just 14 (25%) were in the attacking third. For Greenwood, it was 16/35 (46%) and 22/57 (39%) for Fernandes. 7 of Pogba’s passes were forward with 9 from Greenwood and 19 from Fernandes. Fernandes had 3 shots, 2 on target and 1 blocked. Pogba had 2 shots; one was off target and one blocked. Greenwood didn’t have a single shot and only managed two take-ons and so failed to show one of his key attributes: pace.

Ronaldo the new van Nistelrooy?

Between 2001 and 2006 Ruud van Nistelrooy scored 150 goals for Manchester United. Only one came from a shot outside the box; he was the archetypal poacher. But his perceived inflexibility was one of the reasons he was jettisoned as Sir Aex Ferguson sought a more fluid style of play and a front three of Rooney, Ronaldo and Tevez would see United become champions of Europe in 2008. Ironically, considering his role in van Nistelrooy leaving, Ronaldo has returned with similar instincts. His goal against West Ham was the second from within the six-yard box since his return after his opener against Newcastle.

As Understat data show all but one of his shots in the league have been inside the penalty box. Two of his three goals showed great anticipation to jump on a loose ball from the goalkeeper. It’s a tactic with a high chance of reward: the xG for his opener against Newcastle was 0.89 whilst the xG for his goal on Sunday was 0.84. The Ronaldo ‘running on the wing’ and scoring wonder goals looks to be a thing of the past.

De Gea about as good as Lloris

This season was going to be difficult for David de Gea. No longer number one for Spain, he was going to second choice to Dean Henderson after a penalty shout-out against Villareal which saw him concede all eleven kicks and miss his own. Of course, his performance in the shout-out in Gdansk was more mixed than people made out at the time. Yes, he was sent the wrong way by three of the kickers:

But on two of the kicks he managed to get a hand to the ball. Not great, but not a disaster either.

What was forgotten in the analysis was the mess Gerónimo Rulli made of Luke Shaw’s penalty, allowing the ball to squirm under him and make it 8-8 in the shoot-out. Such are the vagaries of football Rulli went on to be the hero and de Gea the villain but that nuance got lost in the analysis.

And so to now: Henderson is out after contracting COVID-19 and de Gea is number one again. Following his save against Wolves and now his penalty save against Mark Noble, his first since saving Romelu Lukaku’s spot kick in 2016, he’s achieved that thing beloved of journalists: redemption.

But how is actually doing this season? Date from The Analyst show that only Alisson of Liverpool has a higher goals prevented rate but already the Brazilian and Mendy of Chelsea are starting to standout in terms of goals prevented. The performance thus far of Liverpool and Chelsea, both on 13 points with United, seems to owe a lot to their keepers’ form.
Instead, de Gea’s goals prevented and goals prevented rate both look remarkably similar to another ‘keeper who often receives criticism: Hugo Lloris of Spurs.

Statistics from the Manchester United smartphone application, Stats Zone, Understat and The Analyst

Solskjaer needs more answers than "that's football" to fix United's poor Champions League form

Under Solskjaer United have only won 3 Champions League matches since that night in Paris

In 11 Champions League matches Solskjaer has won 4, lost 7

Under Solskjaer United have managed >50% possession in just two Champions League matches

“Man United are back”

So said Rio Ferdinand on BT Sport after Manchester United overturned a 2-0 first-leg deficit in Paris to beat PSG on 6th March 2019. Gary Neville was effusive too, asking Ole Gunnar Solskjaer, “Where would you like your statue?” 

That result surely helped Solskjaer land the job full time and remains a highlight of his tenure. But the Champions League has been problematic since. Despite some success in the Europa League, making the 2020 semi-final and 2021 final, United’s form under Solskjaer in Europe’s premier competition has been poor.

United have now played 11 matches in the Champions League under Solskjaer. They’ve won four and lost seven (36% win percentage). United have only won 3 matches in the Champions League since that night in Paris. What is also striking is how bad United have been at imposing themselves in those matches. 

12th February 2019

0-2 vs PSG 

Round of 16 Home

44% possession

10 shots/1 on target

6th March 2019

3-1 vs PSG 

Round of 16 Away

28% possession

5 shots/4 on target

10th April 2019

0-1 vs Barcelona

Quarter-Final Home

34% possession

10 shots /0 on target

16th April 2019

0-3 vs Barcelona

Quarter-Final Away

34% possession

9 shots/3 on target

20th October 2020

2-1 vs PSG

Group H Away

41% possession

14 shots/6 on target

28th October 2020

5-0 vs RB Leipzig

Group H Home

48% possession

15 shots/8 on target

4th November 2020

1-2  vs İstanbul Başakşehir

Group H Away

62% possession

9 shots/2 on target

24 November 2020

4-1 vs  İstanbul Başakşehir

Group H Home

49% possession

16 shots/8 on target

2nd December 2020

1-3 vs PSG

Group H Home

44% possession

11 on shots/5 on target

8th December 2020

2-3 vs RB Leipzig 

Group H Away

53% possession

19 on shots/7 on target

14th September 2021

1-2 vs Young Boys

Group F Away

47% possession

2 shots/2 on target 

In comparison Chelsea have now played 8 matches in the Champions League under Thomas Tuchel, winning 6 (including last season’s final), drawing 1 and losing 1 (75% win percentage).

In Klopp’s first Champions League campaign at Liverpool in 2017/18 his side played 13 matches as they finished runners-up, winning 7, drawing 4 and losing two (one of which was the final) (54% win percentage)

It gets worse for Solskjaer. In those eleven matches United have had a majority of possession in only 2 of those matches, both away defeats to İstanbul Başakşehir and RB Leipzig. Even in comfortable home wins against Leipzig (5-0) and  İstanbul Başakşehir (4-1) last season they still had less than 50% possession. On that famous night in Paris in 2019 United went as low as 28% possession.

In the 2-1 defeat to Young Boys on Tuesday their 2 shots represented the lowest total for United under Solskjaer in the Champions League and although they were down to ten men they will be very disappointed in the way they failed yet again to impose themselves in a match at the highest level. 

This is a recurring theme. In the Europa League final against Villareal Solskjaer didn’t make a single change until the 100th minute. His side managed 2 shots on target in 120 minutes. Despite managing 57% possession his side lacked any idea on how to break the Spanish side down. 

Solskjaer’s response to Wan-Bissaka’s red flag surely contributed to this. 4 of his 5 substitutions helped surrender any attacking impetus: Diogo Dalot for Jadon Sancho in the 37th minute, Raphaël Varane for Donny van der Beek in the 46th, Jesse Lingard for Cristiano Ronaldo and Nemanja Matic for Bruno Fernandes both in the 72nd. The only positive substitution, Anthony Martial for Fred, was in the 89th minute.

There are obvious parallels with Gareth Southgate at England. In the Euro 2020 final against Italy Southgate allowed the game to slip away after taking the lead, with only 39% possession. They only managed one shot on target in 120 minutes. 

In game management at the highest level remains the biggest question mark over Solskjaer as a coach. There’s no question that he’s been positive at United, improving both the atmosphere and the squad in general. And his record in the biggest matches in the league has been fine. It’s also true that coaches can overplay their hand when it comes to tailoring their approach to the biggest matches: Pep Guardiola is particularly guilty of this.

But with two matches against Villareal and Atalanta to come this was an opportunity missed for United. The error from Lingard smacked of those last season against İstanbul Başakşehir and RB Leipzig. The margin for error is now much smaller and United will surely have to get at least a draw away in both Spain and Italy now. Unless Solskjaer can improve United’s possession in the Champions League his poor record will become harder to turn around.  He needs more answers than “that’s football”.

Stats from BBC and UEFA

Donny van de Beek to go backwards to go forwards?

  • Fernandes and Pogba have limited van de Beek’s options

  • Solskjaer’s plan for a deeper role could require the Dutchman to form a partnership with Pogba

  • Van de Beek’s form for Ajax suggests this is not his natural role


When Donny van de Beek signed for Manchester United from Ajax on 30th August 2020 for an initial £35 million he felt like a transfer coup. The Dutchman had been courted by Real Madrid and seemed to offer quality to a midfield sorely needing one.

However, it has hardly been a success. Solskjaer prefers a three man midfield, a base of two defensive midfielders and an attacking point. With that van de Beek made only four starts in the league last season, and has so far played 5 minutes of this campaign. Yet his performances for Ajax in the 2018/19 Champions League in particular suggested a player of technical ability. It hardly feels like he’s been given a chance for United. So before giving up, where should van de Beek play? 

Perhaps his finest performance for Ajax was in the Champions League semi-final first leg against Spurs on 30th April 2019.  Van de Beek played 90 minutes at the Tottenham Hotspur Stadium as an attacking midfielder with a midfield defensive base of two behind him. He kept his focus to the middle and attacking third and showed a willingness to get inside the box, resulting in a finely taken goal in the 15th minute. Not a single one of his 33 passes was in Ajax’s defensive third.

His only goal so far for United, the consolation in an opening day 3-1 defeat last season to Crystal Palace, followed this pattern. He was almost in the six yard box when he showed poacher instinct to slot the ball to the keeper’s bottom right corner.

Yet this advanced position is precisely the role that Bruno Fernandes has made his own at United. In the match against Newcastle United at the weekend, he played in exactly the same spaces that van de Beek excelled in against Spurs.

It is precisely from the final third where Fernandes scored, the best goal for United at the weekend although he was overshadowed by the story of his countryman Ronaldo. This was already Fernandes’s fourth goal of the season. His numbers against Newcastle were also better than van de Beek’s against Spurs.

He took more passes (58 vs 33), with greater accuracy (82.8% vs 69.7%) all the way showing similar inclinations. Of course, the occasion and level of the opposition have to be taken into account but it is safe to say that the role of United’s attacking midfielder is Fernandes’s for the foreseeable. Further limiting van de Beek’s options in this area is the form of a rejuvenated Jesse Lingard who, in his recent United and England performances, has shown a desire to stick to the final third and run in the box. His goal against Newcastle, United’s fourth, showed exactly that. Paul Pogba, interestingly ignoring van de Beek’s run in the process, found Lingard who took a cool finish. This is precisely the sort of goal van de Beek might have hoped he’d regularly score at United.

If we assume that Jesse Lingard is Fernandes’s alternative then does van de Beek’s future lie further back? The problem with United’s midfield base is obvious. Yet having started the season against Leeds United and Southampton as a wide midfielder for the past two matches Paul Pogba has been pulled back as one of two defensive midfielders, with Fred against Wolves and Matic against Newcastle. The move has been promising.

Against Wolves, he attempted 77 passes with 85.7% accuracy, albeit with only 2 tackles attempted. Neither tackle was successful. Against Newcastle, this went up to 115 attempted passes and 92.5% accuracy. His heatmap shows a desire to play across all of the thirds of the pitch. This suggests that with Fernandes and Ronaldo in front of him and if Jadon Sancho and Mason Greenwood can provide quality in the wide areas, Paul Pogba might now be free to control the midfield as envisioned when he signed in 2016. 

Solskjaer has talked recently of van de Beek playing a deeper role in midfield after an interview where the Dutchman suggested to Rio Ferdinand that he would be happy in this role. Yet will this work if Pogba is the other deep midfielder? Clearly, the Frenchman is good on the ball and in situations where United control possession, such as Newcastle at home.  Yet against Newcastle, he only attempted 5 tackles and only 2 were successful. Against Wolves, he managed to intercept the ball 3 times. He didn’t intercept once against Newcastle. So, if he is to play a deeper role will he need a ‘destroyer’ alongside him? 

Can van de Beek be that player? That will be the question if van de Beek lines up against Pogba. Two possession-focused deep midfielders have their merits especially at home against the likes of Newcastle but in trickier matches, the Dutchman could find himself dropped in favour of Fred or a fit McTominay. Van de Beek’s passing statistics are not as impressive as Pogba’s recent ones. But, if van de Beek could compliment Pogba by providing defensive dynamism alongside the Frenchman’s passing abilities then not only could his place in United’s side be assured but United could fix a problem area for them whilst avoiding an expensive Declan Rice-sized signing. This could be a big ask. This is not where van de Beek specialised for Ajax and, probably, not why he was signed for United. Whether or not he manages this could decide his United future.

All information courtesy of @StatsZone

Greenwood should clearly be first-choice over Martial

Cristiano Ronaldo’s return to Old Trafford is likely to be as a centre-forward, joining Edinson Cavani as and out-and-out striker at United. So far Mason Greenwood and Anthony Martial have started as centre-forward for United, the Englishman against Leeds United and Wolverhampton Wanderers with the Frenchman starting against Southampton in-between.

Although both players are similar: versatile forwards with pace, the picture forming of how they’ve approached the centre-forward role shows that Greenwood should be first-choice over Martial. And that’s ignoring the fact that Greenwood already has three goals this season, scoring in every match. All statistics are from the Manchester United and StatsZone applications.

  • In both of his starts at centre-forward Greenwood has touched the ball on average once every two minutes played and had 88% passing accuracy. He’s scored with every shot on target

  • Martial as centre-forward managed one touch every 5 minutes played and made only 4 successful passes

  • Martial more involved as a winger than striker but Greenwood is equally proficient as a striker or winger

In the season opener against Leeds United Greenwood played 90 minutes as a centre-forward. He took 46 touches, roughly one touch for every two minutes played.

He attempted 25 passes, 22 (88%) were successful. 7 of his passes were forward. He attempted to dribble past an opponent (take-on) 9 times and was successful with 5 of them. He took 3 shots, one of which was on target, his goal. he passed to eight different opponents.

Against Wolves Greenwood played 89 minutes at centre-forward. He took 44 touches: an average of 0.49 touches per minute. In other words, roughly one touch every two minutes.

He attempted 24 passes, 21 (88%) of which found their target. He passed to seven different teammates; midfielders, defenders and a striker. He attempted five take-ons and was successful with two of them. He created two chances for his teammates. He took three shorts with one being on target, his goal.

Against Southampton Greenwood played on the right for 90 minutes. He managed 45 touches, exactly one touch for every 2 minutes played.

He attempted 25 passes, 19 of which were on target to 8 different teammates. 2 passes were forward. He created one chance. He attempted 2 take-ons, one of which was successful. He had 5 shots, one of which was on target, his goal.

In comparison against Southampton Martial played 59 minutes at centre-forward during which he took 13 touches. That’s 0.22 touches per minute or, roughly, one touch every 5 minutes he played.

His involvement was very limited. He had one shot and created no chances for his teammates. He attempted only 6 passes, four of which were on target. Two of those passes were to Luke Shaw. He didn’t attempt a single take-on. No passes were forward.

The situation had been little better against Leeds. Martial came on for Paul Pogba on the left-side in the 75th minute. He made 9 touches in 15 minutes, in other words one touch for every five minutes played.

He did manage two successful take-ons but attempted only 7 passes, 5 (71%) were successful, to 4 teammates. Two of his passes were forwards but he didn’t create any chances or have any shots.

Things were better against Wolves. Martial was brought on for Jadon Sancho in the 72nd minute and so played on the left rather than as a centre-forward. In his 18 minutes he touched the ball 19 times, more than one touch a minute.

Although his play was focused to the left side he was more productive making 11 passes, 8 of which were on target to 4 teammates. 2 passes were forward. He managed one successful take-on.

In conclusion, Greenwood has been remarkable consistent as a centre-forward or playing off the wing. In each match he has got involved in play, touching the ball on average once every two minutes. He’s attempted a similar number of passes in each match with a lot of teammates. He’s had three shots on target and scored with each one.

In an age where strikers are expected to link up with play à la Harry Kane Mason Greenwood is showing all the attributes of the modern forward. Anthony Martial has shown better numbers playing from the wing, especially against Wolves, but in terms of overall contribution to the team is lagging behind Mason Greenwood as a centre-forward or wide forward. The excitement of that match against Liverpool when ‘Tony Martial came from France’ seems a while ago.

United’s Weak Base

  • In both matches so far this season Fred has missed one in four passes and given the ball away once every four touches

  • Against Southampton both Fred and Matic had 75% passing accuracy and gave the ball away once every four touches

  • In comparison Kovacic had 94% passing accuracy against Arsenal

Manchester United have a midfield problem. This is nothing new. Shinji Kagawa, Nick Powell, Tom Cleverley, Marouane Fellaini, Morgan Schneiderlin, Bastian Schweinsteiger, Ander Herrera, Daley Blind, Ángel Di María and Henrikh Mkhitaryan have all been tried in midfield and all have left. You could argue that the middle of United’s line-up hasn’t worked properly since that days of Paul Scholes and Michael Carrick.

In their two matches so far this season United have played a 4-2-3-1 formation with Fred-plus-one forming the defensive midfield two. Dropping two points at St. Mary’s highlighted United’s weakness in this area. All stats are courtesy of the Manchester United and StatsZone applications.


Against Leeds United Fred was partnered with Scott McTominay. Fred played all 90 minutes whilst McTominay played for 70 before being replaced with Nemanja Matić. Although Fred scored he didn’t create any chances. In a total of 53 touches he gave the ball away 13 times, once every 4.08 touches. McTominay managed 48 touches and gave the ball away 8 times, once every 6 touches. 29 of Fred’s 38 passes (76%) found their target, 27 of McTominay’s 32 passes (84%) found theirs. 

Against Southampton, though, the situation was gloomier. Fred touched the ball 70 times. His partner Matić 91 times. Fred won the ball back 13 times, Matić 11 times. But the Brazilian conceded possession 16 times (once every 4.38 touches) while the Serbian lost it 22 times (once every 4.14 touches). In other words, the two players making up United’s midfield base were both giving the ball away with every fourth touch.

Fred did show some creative zeal with a neat lobbed pass to Mason Greenwood.

He also has a willingness to close down play which, unfortunately, led to him scoring an own goal.

But for two matches now the Brazilian has consistently conceded possession for every four touches he makes. His passing accuracy has also been consistent with a quarter of his passes missing in both matches. 

Against Southampton Fred’s passing accuracy was 75%. Matić’s was almost identical again at 76%.

On the same day as United’s match against Southampton Chelsea faced Arsenal with a central midfield of Jorginho and Mateo Kovačić. Jorginho’s passing accuracy was 87%. Kovačić managed 94%. Rodri played at the base of Manchester City’s midfield against Norwich City the day before. His passing accuracy was 91%. 

Of course, it is difficult to compare different midfielders playing different opposition. But in a season where Paul Pogba has already matched the number of goal assists managed in the whole of last season’s league campaign (5) and Bruno Fernandes has helped himself to a hattrick, United’s defensive midfield is clearly an area of weakness. Fred’s time at United has never been easy, with Mourinho making it clear from the beginning that he didn’t want him. Regardless, it would not be hard for opposition coaches to target this area. United’s apparent interest in Saúl Ñíguez and Eduardo Camavinga is not difficult to understand. 

The Pressing Issue: why Manchester City could have been looking at the wrong Spurs striker (and how Ronaldo would be a bad idea)

  • Harry Kane presses less than Sergio Aguero 

  • Son Heung-Min presses more than all of City’s forwards

  • Son is better than Kane at disrupting opponents and retaining the ball

  • Only 1% of all forwards press less than Ronaldo (even Zlatan presses more!)

After all that Harry Kane is staying. Never mind the image of England’s captain effectively going on strike to try and force his move. Never mind the fact he signed a contract with no release clause in the first place. Never mind the fact that England’s champions could apparently countenance spending more than £100 million twice this transfer window when Barcelona had to release their captain due to financial fair play. 

The transfer saga of the summer was risible in many ways. But did it make sense for Manchester City to go after Harry Kane? On the face of it, yes. Their top goalscorer last season was a player primarily signed as a defensive midfielder while Kane topped both the charts for league goalsl scored and created. Manchester City’s top goalscorer of all time has just retired. They have the sovereign wealth of a country to spend and, for now, are able to. Why would they not go for Harry Kane?

Except they could well be going after the wrong Tottenham Hotspur forward. Despite the love-in at the end of Sergio Aguero’s time at the Etihad a frequent criticism of the Argentinian from Pep Guardiola was his lack of pressing. 

And, looking at data from the past 365 days, we can see that Sergio Aguero was not as frequent a presser as his teammate Gabriel Jesus. Per 90 minutes played Aguero would apply 13.8 pressures (applying pressure to an opposing player who is receiving, carrying or releasing the ball) versus Jesus with 14.88. Yet Kane is even lower than Aguero at 11.21 pressures per 90 minutes. 


Of course, Kane is not a traditional ‘target man. For both club and country, he often drops as far back as the midfield in order to be involved with play. His fine link-up with Raheem Sterling for England will not have gone unnoticed by Guardiola. 

But the key to Manchester City’s press is to protect their ‘back five’ of Fernandinho and defence. And if Guardiola were to sign a forward based on his desire to maintain a press he could do well to look at another Spurs player: Son Heung-Min. He made 17.46 presses per 90 minutes over the past year. This is more than not just Kane, Aguero and Jesus but also Raheem Sterling (10.06) and Ferrán Torres (14.92). While he scored 11 goals fewer than Kane last season across all competitions Son did provide the same number of assists and his return of 22 goals would have easily made City’s top scorer. 


Son also has a feature Guardiola admires: versatility. He can play across the forward line as well as midfield. Using data from SmarterScout comparing Son and Kane as centre-forwards shows that while the South Korean scores far lower in shooting (10 vs 82) his ball retention (71 vs 19) and disruption (67 vs 18) are far higher.

Harry Kane is one of the best strikers in the world and it may be that Guardiola wants him to score goals with little thought to other aspects.  If Guardiola does want a striker to better suit his demands it may be that he’s looking at the wrong Spurs player.

While we’re at it Cristiano Ronaldo (6.69 pressures per game) makes even less sense for Guardiola. He’s in the first percentile for pressing amongst forwards. This means only 1% of forwards press less than Ronaldo. Even Zlatan Ibrahimović (7.21 pressures per game) presses more.

Paul Pogba: Midfield Maestro

Shutterstock

Paul Pogba has been an enigma since his return to Old Trafford in 2016. Yet, the sense has always been that the Frenchman’s true potential and United’s are linked; unlock one and you unlock the other.

In the 5-1 victory over Leeds United on Saturday he demonstrated a devastating range of passing. There was a one-touch lob to Bruno Fernandes for United’s opener, the pinpoint pass from his own half for Mason Greenwood to restore the lead, another through-ball to Fernandes on the ground, and then a pass across the penalty area for Fred to score number five.

In all he created five chances for United and four goals with a pass completion rate of 76%. What is also of note is the sheer variety of passing he offered, from deep and the final third, shifting the play, with long passes and short.

But the most impressive statistic is that in just one match Pogba provided only one assist fewer than in the whole of the 2021/21 Premier League. This following an impressive Euro 2020 performance in which Pogba scored once, created another goal and completed 88% of his passes. If this form continues and his teammates can continue to work on his wavelength then Pogba will be a devastating linchpin to United’s attack. He may even get a compliment from Graeme Souness.

What the statistics tell us: five lessons for England from Euro 2020

Success has many parents, failure is an orphan. The England men’s football team which has brought so much joy to a nation the past few weeks fell at the final hurdle. After defeat comes the post-mortem. And while for a few troglodytes this means carte blanche to unleash hatred and violence (and if you know what ‘troglodyte’ and ‘carte blanche’ mean you’re unlikely to be one of them) for the rest of us there is a chance to make an honest assessment of Gareth Southgate’s team.

Gareth Southgate’s achievements as England manager (a World Cup semi-final, a Nations League semi-final, and a Euro final) are unprecedented. Equally as impressive is how he has transcended the role and helped forge a team that once again feels connected to the fans.

For the first time since Glenn Hoddle at France ’98 England had a manager with a tactical plan and the conviction to drop and pick players based on that plan. And in reaching the final we have seven matches’ worth of statistics to look at. And in studying those data five key messages come out with some hint of how England can improve for next year’s World Cup.

England pass but don’t press and the tournament ended with a familiar pattern


At Euro 2020 England were a team who liked to pass the ball. Only Spain managed more sequences involving more than 10 passes. Yet when it comes to pressing the picture is mixed. Only Spain and Italy had more pressing sequences (passages of play where an opponent has the ball in your defensive third but through pressing within 3 or fewer passes the ball is back in their half). However, all three other semi-finalists and the Dutch, who were knocked out in the round of 16, managed more high turnovers (sequences in open play starting within 40 metres of the opponent's goal). In terms of passes per defensive action (PPDA), a measure of pressing, England fell very short. Essentially, the lower the number the more pressing a team is. England were a distant fourth amongst the semi-finalists. Spain had the lowest PPDA at Euro 2020, Denmark and Italy were seventh and eighth respectively. England had the nineteenth lowest PPDA at Euro 2020. Scotland with a PPDA of 15 was fourteenth.

However, under Gareth Southgate a pattern is emerging against their toughest opponents. ‘First half good, second half not so good’ was a trope under Sven Goran-Erikkson but has repeated under Southgate. Against Italy England started brightly, scored in the second minute, finished the first half on a high and then faded in the second. This was a familiar pattern, having also been seen in the 2018 World Cup semi-final against Croatia (scored in the 5th minute), and the Nations League matches against Spain (three first half goals) and the Netherlands (scored in the 31st minute).

In all four matches, England scored first and mostly controlled the first half before ceding the second. In all four matches, England ended up being dominated in terms of possession and shots. Only against Spain did England avoid defeat and win despite being thoroughly outplayed, largely because they’d managed a 3–0 lead and just held on.

All of this suggests a worrying pattern for Southgate’s England. ‘Scoring too soon’ is a cliche in football but seems to be the norm for England in their biggest matches. Southgate plans meticulously yet it feels like the bigger matches slip away from him with changes made too late or not at all. Against Italy, Southgate did not make any substitutions until after England had conceded an equaliser.

England reliant on Kane and Sterling

Only John Stones (679) and Kalvin Phillips (665) played more minutes than Kane (649) and Sterling (641) at Euro 2020. The forwards had the most shots and highest expected goals ratings of any England player with Maguire and Mount coming distant thirds respectively. Against Italy neither player managed a single shot. By controlling Kane and Sterling Italy were able to nullify most of England’s threat.

Kane and Sterling were not at the end of movements; they also involved themselves in passing sequences. In total Sterling was involved in 24 passing sequences which finished with a shot and 6 which finished with a goal. Kane was involved in 21 sequences which ended with a shot and 7 which ended with a goal. The total expected goals for movements (total expected goal value of unique open play shot or goal-ending sequences that a player was involved in) involving Sterling was 7.08 and 6.38 for those involving Kane. Kalvin Phillips was a distant third.

With the next World Cup coming in less than 18 months this is concerning for Gareth Southgate. England’s reliance on Kane and Sterling is obvious. There are alternatives; Marcus Rashford is an obvious one. The question is whether Southgate will experiment by resting Kane and Sterling to offload pressure and find those alternatives.

Defenders the best form of attack

While England were reliant on Kane and Sterling Euro 2020 was a tournament where defenders were the best form of attack. Of the 14 players who created a chance for England at Euro 2020, 8 were defenders or defensive midfielders. The top ten average progress (the vertical distance the ball was carried) for England featured five defenders. Luke Shaw created two goals for England, Kalvin Phillips and Kieran Trippier created one each. Luke Shaw’s expected assist, a measure of the quality of a chance created, was the highest for England at 1.65.


If we look at the expected goals for passing sequences as already discussed Sterling and Kane were a distant first and second for England. But, incredibly, six defensive players were in the top ten.

Three of England’s ten goals were scored by defenders or defensive midfielders (Maguire, Shaw, and Henderson). Kane and Sterling scored the rest. Against Italy in the final Shaw scored and Maguire had a headed chance, making them more of an attacking threat than Kane or Sterling. Maguire’s penalty against Italy was the best of the shoot-out. ‘Shawberto Carlos’ has been a hero this summer and the inclusion of him and Maguire in the team of the tournament was well deserved.

English defenders at Euro 2020 were allowed to carry the ball, create chances, and were involved in the sequences with amongst the highest chances of scoring. This was not a tournament for excellent English attacking midfielders. This brings us to the next point…

Grealish, Foden, and Saka not the saviours we thought?

A lot of column inches and air time was given to the virtues of Jack Grealish, Phil Foden, and Bukayo Saka. In one of his more parochial utterances, Lee Dixon referred to Southgate introducing Jack Grealish as “giving the people what they want”. However, the picture from the statistics would suggest that Dixon and ‘the people’ were wrong.

Grealish carried the ball for an average of 13.2 metres. Only Marcus Rashford carried the ball more. In terms of average carry progress, Grealish was fifth in the squad. The Aston Villa man also created two goals: Sterling’s versus the Czech Republic and Kane’s versus Germany. However, for a side built around passing the ball, he managed only 71 passes, the 15th highest in the squad.

Despite creating two goals his expected assist value was only 0.87. If we look again at the goals he created we can see why. The chance Grealish created for Sterling against the Czechs had an expected goal rating of 0.46 meaning there was a 46% chance of scoring given the position of two defenders and the ‘keeper.

Against Germany Grealish chipped the ball to Kane who received the ball slightly below head height a few yards from goal. Options for Kane were limited, it was too low to conventionally head and too high to chest and control or volley.

Compare that to Luke Shaw’s pass to Raheem Sterling for England’s first goal against Germany. It’s across the ground and into the space that Sterling had found. As a result, Sterling had a 66% chance of scoring and a relatively simple finish.

Compare that to Grealish’s pass where there was a 47% chance of Kane scoring. In the end, it was Kane’s reactions and an imaginative header into the ground which turned the chance into a goal. A successful pass but not a reliable one. The expected goals for passing sequences Grealish was involved in was the 10th highest for the squad, a statistic which becomes even less impressive as we learn that sixteen players in total were involved in a shot or goal-ending movement, placing Grealish in the bottom half.

The data for Grealish suggest the reason for being a crowd favourite: people love to see a player run with the ball. But the end results were mixed. He has a reputation as the most fouled player in the Premier League but at the elite level, you need more than just an ability to run.

Phil Foden is coached at club level by Pep Guardiola. Yet he only managed 71 passes, the same as Grealish. He created two chances, one more than Grealish, but had zero assists and an expected assist of just 0.08. His sequence involvement expected assists was 0.96, the 13th highest of the England squad. If fans had hoped that Foden would bring some Guardiola football to England it didn’t come to pass.

The picture is much the same for Bukayo Saka. Thirteenth in the England squad for both passes (81) and expected assists (0.07) Saka created just one chance, zero goals, and was fifteenth for sequence involvement expected goals. In other words, despite the hype, Saka was not a creative attacking force for England. A lot was made of his pace but his average progress carry was the 9th highest, Harry Maguire was 8th. Ignoring his penalty miss, Saka’s final performance was non-existent, his only opportunity to run being cruelly ended by Chiellini.

It is unfair to lay this all at the feet of Grealish, Foden and Saka. As already shown, England were a team that used Kane, Sterling, and defensive players as their main creative sources. The more attacking midfielders were largely bypassed. Southgate needs to assess how players like Grealish, Foden, and Saka fit into this picture. Foden and Saka in particular are young and have time on their hands. This may have been a tournament too soon for the Arsenal youngster and hopefully, he will be protected over the season ahead. Foden will have more tuition from Guardiola and Southgate should use that experience.

With 223 passes between them, an average expected assist of 0.34 and less creative involvement than several defenders, Grealish, Foden and Saka were not the saviours they were made out to be. Grealish at Manchester City is a strange fit.

Pickford better than Donnarumma

Italian goalkeeper Gianluigi Donnarumma was named Player of the Tournament for Euro 2020 and took the ‘keeper spot in the Team of the Tournament showing talent and attitude belying his youth. However, by every metric Jordan Pickford was superior at Euro 2020. Despite playing fewer minutes (690 to the Italian’s 719) Pickford faced more shots (18 to 13). He conceded fewer goals despite having greater expected goals conceded (number of goals that a keeper was expected to concede, given the quality of the on-target shots he faced).

This means that in terms of goals prevented (number of goals that a goalkeeper was expected to concede compared to the number that they actually conceded, according to expected goals conceded) Donnarumma prevented -0.1 goals. This suggests he actually conceded more goals than he should while Pickford prevented 2. His goal prevention rate was more than double the Italian’s. Pickford faces a lot of scrutiny at club level and Euro 2020 was no different, especially regarding the goal he conceded against Denmark and his demeanor on the ball. But the statistics are clear. He was brilliant at Euro 2020. And that’s without mentioning two fine saves in the final penalty shoot-out including against ‘Mr 100%: Jorginho. And he was unlucky with Italy’s equaliser as the ball ricocheted off the post following an excellent save. By all means laud Donnarumma. Pickford was actually better. 

This (Could Be) England 2021: the alternate Euro squad

Football, like life, is full of those ‘sliding doors’ moments. What if Ali Bin Nasser had spotted Diego Maradona’s handball against England in 1986 and sent him off with the score kept at 0-0? What if Paul Gascoigne had not checked his run when Alan Shearer played the ball across to him against Germany in 1996? The butterfly effect in chaos theory would have us believe that just small changes can lead to differences far bigger than we could predict. With that in mind, here is a twenty-six-man squad which, had the last decade gone differently, could be representing England at this summer’s European Championships.

GK

Jack Butland

England Debut: 2012

Age:28

Caps:9

Jack Butland really could be England’s Number One. A non-playing member of the Euro 2012 squad, Butland was also the Number One for Great Britain at the London Olympics. Injury cost him a place at Euro 2016 but in the build-up to Russia 2018 Southgate had a choice between Butland and Jordan Pickford for goalkeeper. It was the latter’s distribution which tipped the balance but Butland could very easily have been the first choice. After signing for Crystal Palace in 2020 he’s spent most of the past year on the sidelines. This year along came Dean Henderson and Butland couldn’t make the squad ahead of West Brom’s Number One.

Joe Hart

England Debut: 2008

Age: 34

Caps: 75

In an alternate universe Joe Hart is still England’s Number One. After the David James/Rob Green debacle of 2010 it felt like Joe Hart could be England’s first choice goalkeeper for the next decade and beyond ala David Seaman. Then, so the story goes, Pirlo scored a panenka against him. Suddenly there wasn’t the skill to match the cockiness as Hart never seemed to fulfill his promise. Pep Guardiola dropped him as soon as he joined City. To Hart’s credit he did seek a challenge at Torino. A move to Burnley followed where he was actually blamed for making them worse. Gareth Southgate’s first Number One, he was dropped before the last World Cup. He was last seen as pundit for the League Cup final between City and Spurs where he trolled Spurs despite currently being employed by them. He did match Seaman for caps, though.

Alex McCarthy

England Debut: 2018

Age: 31

Caps: 1

A promising arrival to the Premier League for Reading, including a stunning performance at Anfield, McCarthy received his first call-up in 2013. He didn’t make his England debut until 2018, keeping a clean sheet against the USA. It’s a hard life as a third choice goalkeeper but McCarthy could have expected more. Fraser Forster managed 6 caps, in comparison. 


RB

Nathaniel Clyne

England Debut:2014

Age:30

Caps: 14

Younger than Kieran Trippier and made his England debut 3 years earlier. Clyne was first choice right back in 5 of England’s last 6 qualifiers for Euro 2016 yet lost his place to Kyle Walker. Even in a squad of 10 right backs it is hard to imagine him getting a place. 

Martin Kelly

England Debut: 2012

Age: 31

Caps: 1

A late call-up to the Euro 2012 squad Martin Kelly is the answer to the question ‘England player with the shortest playing time’ thanks to two minutes played coming on as a substitute against Norway in a friendly. A fine career has followed at Crystal Palace but not reached the heights he may have hoped for in 2012.


CB


Chris Smalling 

England Debut:2011

Age: 31

Caps: 31


A first-choice centre back in 2016 when John Stones had 10 caps and Harry Maguire was yet to make his England debut. Having been paired with Gary Cahill in France Smalling must have thought he was going to be England’s senior defender for the foreseeable future. It was not to. Southgate sought other options, blaming Smalling’s lack of quality on the ball. A move to Roma and no further caps followed.


Phil Jones

England Debut: 2011

Age: 29

Caps:27


It’s not his fault for the injuries. It’s not his fault he has a meme-able face. It’s not his fault a clearly intoxicated Sir Alex Ferguson said he could be Manchester United’s greatest ever player. Sir Bobby Charlton compared him to Duncan Edwards. Fabio Capello compared him Franco Baresi. In an alternate universe ‘Smalling and Jones’ is a partnership to rival Bruce-Pallister or Ferdinand-Vidic. But it just hasn’t happened. He made the last World Cup, playing the two defeats to Belgium. 


James Tarkowski

England Debut: 2018

Age: 28

Caps: 2


Part of the standby list for Russia 2018. He might look at Ben White’s inclusion and wonder.


Steven Caulker 

England Debut: 2012

Age: 29

Caps: 1

Remember him? Another member of the Great Britain team in 2012, making 5 appearances, Caulker made his senior England debut in 2012 against Sweden. He scored, making it 2-1 before coming off. Ibrahimovic scored THAT goal as Sweden won 4-2 in the end. And Caulker never played for England again. He’s currently plying his trade in Turkey for Alanyaspor.

Michael Keane

England Debut: 2017

Age: 28

Caps: 12

Twelve caps and a goal to boot. Once linked with Manchester United before a £25 million move to Everton. Keane was part of the squad for the 2019 Nations League finals. There’s still a chance for him to feature again but he must also wonder about Ben White’s inclusion. 

LB

Ryan Bertrand

England Debut: 2012

Age:31

Caps:19


Making your European club debut in the Champions League final is no bad way to mark your arrival. Bertrand also played at London 2012. He might have hoped to replace Ashley Cole at club and country level. He was part of the Euro 2016 squad but, just as with Clyne, it has not happened since.


Danny Rose

England Debut: 2016

Age: 30

Caps: 29

Another Olympic player in 2012, Rose was England’s left back at Euro 2016. He made the 2018 squad and won praise from Southgate for speaking out about his mental health. However, converted right sided player Ashley Young was preferred to him in Russia. Rose is two years younger than Young was in 2018. In Russia Rose must have had hopes of becoming England’s first choice left back again; at that point Luke Shaw’s last cap was in 2015 and Ben Chilwell was yet to play for his country. Rose announced himself at Spurs with a stunning goal against Arsenal. Yet he will also be remembered for a few awkward scenes on Amazon Prime’s ‘All or Nothing’.

MF

Jack Wilshere

England Debut: 2010

Age: 29

Caps: 32

The next Gazza. A future England captain. It felt like we heard about Jack Wilshere’s precocious talent before he even made his Arsenal debut aged just 16 in 2008. In 2011 he dazzled as Arsenal beat Barcelona 2-1. Then it all seems to have gone wrong. Injuries haven’t helped; Wilshere made the Euro 2016 squad despite playing only 3 Premier League matches more than I did in 2015-16. He now serves as the classic example of ‘what if?’ Remember: Wilshere is younger than Jordan Henderson.


Tom Cleverly

England Debut: 2012

Age: 31

Caps: 13

Included here not so much for his England form as for some of the hyperbole amongst my fellow United fans who would have had you believe that we were looking at the next Paul Scholes and future Old Trafford legend. It of course did not happen. Less the next Scholes, more the English Darron Gibson his last cap was in 2013.

Adam Lallana

England Debut:2013

Age: 33

Caps: 34


Lallana went to Brazil in 2014 and played in three of England’s four matches at the last Euros. He then scored the only goal of the Sam Allardyce era, finishing as England’s player of the year for 2016. Injuries have hit his career hard since. A quality, skilful player, England’s midfield could be his at an age where Xavi was at his peak. It’s not proven to be so.


Lewis Cook

England Debut: 2018

Age: 24

Caps: 1


Who? Lewis Cook was the captain of the England Under-20 team which won the 2017 FIFA Under-20 World Cup, the same squad which featured Dean Henderson and Dominic Calvert-Lewin. That year a certain Phil Foden scored twice in the final of the Under-17 equivalent. It has not been a similar jump for Lewis Cook. He was on standby for Russia and that summer he captained the victorious England team at the Toulon tournament. However, it now looks like he’ll be stuck on his one senior cap.

Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain

England Debut: 2012

Age: 27

Caps: 35


More talented than Henderson. More gifted than Rice. A member of the England squads in 2012 and 2014, Oxlade-Chamberlain has been similarly hit by injury as Lallana. There may still be time for him with England; he’s only a year older than James Ward-Prowse. 

Dele Alli

England Debut: 2015

Age: 25 

Caps: 37


A regular starter in 2018 Dele Alli also went to the Nations League finals in 2019. It says a lot about his deterioration in form over the past two years that his exclusion from England’s provisional squad didn’t even cause us to bat an eyelid.  Jesse Lingard has shown how it is possible to turn around a career slump. A big season awaits for Dele Alli at club and international level.


Eric Dier

England Debut: 2015

Age: 27

Caps: 45


The scorer of England’s first goal at Euro 2016. The scorer of the winning penalty against Colombia. A member of the 2019 Nations League squad. Yet again, as with Dele Alli, his exclusion has not caused any consternation even though he can play in defence and so would offer options to a squad hit with injuries. A versatile player who developed in Portugal, Dier is intriguing and could still play an international role. A crucial season awaits for him, just as with his Tottenham teammate above. 

Ruben Loftus-Cheek

England Debut: 2017

Age: 25

Caps: 10


A frustrating player who featured in 2018 yet has spent the last season in an unsuccessful relegation battle at Fulham. No longer a youngster it feels like his chance may have come and gone already. His last cap was in 2018.


Ross Barkley

England Debut: 2013 

Age: 27

Caps: 33


As with Loftus-Cheek no longer a youngster. His big move to Chelsea came by burning all of his bridges at Everton yet he was able to have a solid if unspectacular season at Aston Villa. He played in Portugal in 2019 but the emergence of Mason Mount and Phil Foden has meant he is unlikely to feature in Gareth Southgate’s plans again.


FW

Andy Carroll

England Debut: 2010

Age: 32

Caps: 9


Comparisons with Alan Shearer were always going to be lazy and set him up to fail. His goal against Sweden in Euro 2012 is one of the finest headers you are likely to see. Yet injuries and accusations of a lack of focus cost him, dear. The deal which took him to Liverpool and Fernando Torres to Chelsea was as devastating to him as it was the Spaniard. Less was made of a Uruguayan called Luis Suárez joining Liverpool on the same day which says a lot. Speaking of other Liverpool strikers: Rickie Lambert has more England caps. And goals.


Daniel Sturridge

England Debut: 2011

Age: 31 

Caps: 26


Yet another London 2012 player. Sturridge will probably be remembered more for his irritating celebration (and Subway advert) than for anything else which is a shame. In 2013/14 he formed a partnership with Suárez which almost delivered the title to Anfield. That summer he scored in Brazil. It has been downhill ever since despite scoring the winner against Wales at Euro 2016. Questions were raised over his attitude especially over playing with injuries and he has been without a club since March 2020 when Turkish club Trabzonspoor terminated his contract with mutual agreement. Southgate turned the page on Sturridge’s England career in 2017. 


Theo Walcott

England Debut: 2006

Age: 32

Caps: 47


It’s hard to say which came out worse from Sven-Göran Eriksson's choice to pick a 17-year-old with no top flight appearances for Germany 2006: England’s World Cup chances or Theo Walcott. There have been bright moments since: a hat-trick against Croatia and a goal against Sweden at Euro 2012. But 2006 remains his only World Cup. However, 47 caps is a fine achievement and even more remarkable considering his last cap was in 2016. 


Danny Welbeck

England Debut: 2011

Age: 30

Caps: 42


Danny Welbeck was in England’s 2018 squad. No, really he was. Check. See? A versatile forward player Welbeck scored a backheel flick at Euro 2012 and was top scorer in qualifying for Euro 2016. With England blessed with regard to pacey winger/forwards Welbeck’s chances at international level have gone. He can look back on a career at domestic level with five major honours including the 2008 FIFA Club World Cup.


Callum Wilson

England Debut: 2018 

Age: 29

Caps: 4

Scored on his debut against the USA and went to Portugal in 2019. Once linked with moves to Stamford Bridge and Old Trafford, Wilson last played for England in that infamous 6-0 in Bulgaria. His England chances look to have gone but he is far from finished in the top flight: last season he managed 12 goals in 28 matches for a Newcastle United not known for attacking play. In comparison, Jamie Vardy managed 17 goals in 48 matches for high-flying Leicester City.



One leg is better than two: why we don't need two-legged fixtures in the Champions League & Europa League

The times they are a-changing. The last fortnight has seen the return of knock-out European football. Last autumn it was announced that UEFA look set to change the format of the Champions League in favour of a ‘Swiss system’ with four more matches. This will be a mistake. This is not the change needed. We got an idea of the change needed last summer.

* * *

Out of the horror of the COVID-19 pandemic have been glimpses at something different. Some of this has been profound: pollution reduced or the daily commute eliminated. Another change, albeit meaningless in the grand scheme of things but significant in its own way was the single-legged format of the final stage of the Champions League and Europa League held in Portugal and Germany respectively. As Arrigo Sacchi put it: “football is the most important of the least important things in life”.

The first European Cup in 1955–56 consisted of 29 matches from start to finish. The following year’s edition contained a preliminary round and tiebreakers and so consisted of 44 matches from start to finish. The 2018–19 tournament, not including qualifiers, consisted of 125.

In the 2018–19 Champions League, the knockout phase began on February 12th and consisted of twenty-eight matches before the final on 1st June. In the 2019–20 season once the single-legged format began at the quarter-final stage there were only 7 matches including the final between 12th and 23rd August. That was it. None of the coaches or players with one eye on domestic football between two legs of continental football, this was distilled and focused. In a summer where the European Championship was cancelled this was tournament football which, although without fans, was compelling in a way that the traditional format couldn’t achieve.

It seems every season now fixture congestion raises its head. We debate the merits of the League Cup, the need for FA Cup replays and a winter break. Yet every season we continue to play 28 matches over 3 months in the Champions League without question. In an age of great awareness over travel and its environmental impact as well as ever-greater squeezing of the football fan’s wallet could the knockout stages we’ve just seen be a blueprint for the future?

The double-legged format of the knockout stages of European club football has been in place since inception. In many ways, it’s a vestige of the competitions at their genesis, before group stages became entrenched in the 1990s and beyond. Back then it was knockout football from the beginning. Without seeding. In 1978 Nottingham Forest were rewarded for their league win with a first-round draw against defending European champions Liverpool. They won. In 1960 defending European champions and five times consecutive winners Real Madrid were drawn against Spanish champions Barcelona. And lost. You played the team you were drawn against home and away. Add up the aggregate score and whoever has the most goals went through. Simple.

The worth of group stages, wherein the Champions League 96 matches are played so the top-seeded 16 clubs invariably go through and the bottom seeded 16 go out, can be debated but won’t change as it’s UEFA’s concession to their lower-ranked members. With a group stage, even the worst teams are guaranteed 6 matches with all the involved money. That won’t change. Now we have an idea of what is possible with the knockout rounds. UEFA President Aleksander Ceferin has recently announced that the new format could be the future from the 2025 season. Should it be?

Of course, in order to change from two legs to one, we’d have to look at what we might lose. As a Manchester United fan, I think back to that second leg against Roma in 2007 turning a 2–1 first leg deficit around with a 7–1 win at home. Chelsea fans will point to Napoli in 2012 on their way to glory. Liverpool fans to Barcelona in 2019. The 2018–19 Champions League, in particular, was a season of great comebacks in the second leg for Manchester United, Ajax, Tottenham Hotspur and, of course, Liverpool. This is what romance in sport is made of: a team coming from behind to win against the odds.

But how often does it actually happen? The Champions League has been in its current format since 2003. The Europa League since 2009. In the 16 seasons between 2003 and 2019 that meant 448 knockout matches, not including finals for the Champions League. For the Europa League, that’s 600 from 2009 to 2019.

Let’s look at those matches and see which knockout fixtures ‘needed’ a second leg. To do that we’ll look at the number of knockout fixtures where a team lost the first leg but won the second. These are the only fixtures where the second leg ‘mattered’. We’ll then look at how many times that ‘changed’ the outcome of that particular fixture i.e. the team losing the first leg came from behind to go through. We won’t include ties where the first leg was drawn because in a single-leg fixture the match would just go to extra time. This is only the matches where a full second 90 minutes changed the outcome.

Champions League knockout fixtures 2003-2019.

In the Champions League, a team lost the first leg but won the second 42 times between 2003 and 2019. The peak was 7 times in 2011–12 and 2018–19. The lowest number was once in 2005–06 and 2008–09. There was no season where a team didn’t manage to go through despite losing the first leg. The peak of a team changing the outcome was in 2018–19 when the team winning the second leg after losing the first went through 86% of the time (6/7).

Europa League knockout fixtures 2009-2019.

In the Europa League, a team lost the first leg but won the second 76 times. The peak was 11 times in 2017–18. The lowest number was 6 times in 2013–14 and 2017–18. There was no season where a team didn’t manage to go through despite losing the first leg. The peak of a team changing the outcome was also in 2018–19 when the team winning the second leg after losing the first went through 83% of the time (5/6).

In the 64 times in the Champions League where a team won the second leg after losing the first, the outcome was changed 42 times (66%). In the Europa League, it mattered less: 40 times out of 76 (53%). So while it happened more often in the Europa League (not surprising given the greater number of matches played) the effect was larger in the Champions League. The pattern seems to be that if a team can win the second leg after losing the first they are more likely to go through than not, probably due to the psychological impact on their opponent.

In the 224 two-legged knockout Champions League fixtures between 2003 and 2019, a team losing the first leg but going through made up only 18.8% of fixtures

If we include all the fixtures, however, the second leg makes much less sense. In the 224 two-legged knockout Champions League fixtures between 2003 and 2019, a team went through despite losing the first leg in 18.8% of the ties.

In the 300 two-legged knockout Europa League fixtures between 2009 and 2019 a team losing the first leg but still going through made up only 13.3% of fixtures.

In the Europa League, the point of second legs is even less clear. In the 300 two-legged knockout fixtures between 2009 and 2019, a team going through despite losing the first leg made up only 13.3% of the total fixtures.

In all knockout fixtures in the Champions League between 2003 and 2019 and in the Europa League between 2009 and 2019 a team lost the first leg but managed to go through in 16% of two-legged fixtures.

If we add up the knockout matches for the Champions League and the Europa League that’s 1048 matches played when the second leg was actually needed only 16% of the time across the two competitions.

* * *

This is a decision of rationality vs romance. In 2018 after a first-leg defeat to PSG Ole Gunnar Solskjær opined that “mountains are there to be climbed. You can’t lay down and say ‘this is over’.” We then know what followed. A team coming from behind is probably the most powerful image in any sport. That’s why they stick with us. These are moments that define a season. Without a second leg, Real Madrid would have been knocked out by Wolfsburg in 2016 and not won the competition. Same for Liverpool in 2019. But as we’ve seen, they are rare.

There’s also the factor of a self-fulfilling prophecy here. When Barcelona took to the field at Anfield in 2019 how much was the result against Roma in 2018 playing on their mind? How much was that Barcelona result playing on the minds of the PSG players when they faced Manchester United? Surely it isn’t a coincidence that PSG made the final the season when they only had one two-legged fixture? Having come from behind to beat Atalanta 2–1 in the quarter-finals, would the narrative of bottlers have remained if they’d had to play a second leg?

Another benefit of switching to single legs would be removing the away goals rule. No change since abolishing back passes could improve the game as much. Away goals skew football: I remember in 2011 listening to Radio 5 Live and a Spurs fan called in to say he was disappointed his team had ‘only’ won 1–0 away to AC Milan and not 2–1 because then they could lose 1–0 at home and still go through. Bizarre. The away goal rule punishes a home team for playing on the front foot: better to win 2–0 and stop than carry on attacking and win 3–1 or 4–2. This is insanity. Think of the cynicism we’d lose in one fell swoop.

Olympique Lyonnais played above and beyond against Manchester City last summer and won 3–1. Imagine the narrative under the traditional format. City would have another 90 minutes to come from behind. If their goal were an away goal City might even be favourites still. What if Bayern Munich and Barcelona had to play a second leg after the 8–2? A pointless 90 minutes which could only have threatened injury and suspension for Bayern Munich and embarrassment for Barcelona. As it was Bayern Munich and Lyon won and were through. Barcelona and Manchester City lost and were out. Done and finished after 90 minutes as codified in 1897.

The prestige of the Champions League is the jewel in UEFA’s crown. FIFA has looked enviously at Europe’s premier competition which is largely behind its decision to expand the FIFA World Club Cup. To reduce the number of matches would go against the general trend of football: more teams, more games, more money. Yet this summer we’ve had a glimpse of something else. Crisp and succinct. Rather than a bloated competition across countries and months, this was engrossing tournament football. The only thing it was missing was fans. Once they’re back UEFA could be onto something here. One leg is better than two.







It's Official: Liverpool are currently worse than David Moyes's Manchester United

In the pantheon of appalling Premier League titles Chelsea 2015/16 and Leicester City 2016/17 stand front and centre as the worst examples. Following this, however, would have to be David Moyes’s Manchester United 2013/14. Moyes’s nine-month stint went from being handpicked as Sir Alex Ferguson’s ‘chosen one’ to his banner being almost torn down by angry fans. Liverpool fans at the time gloated about the Scotsman’s troubles. Yet, now in the defence of their first Premier League title, the Merseysiders are officially worse in terms of points than Moyes’s Red Devils.

***

On 9th February 2014 Manchester United found themselves, after 25 league matches played, 7th in the league following a 2-2 draw at home with Fulham. This was the match of 81 crosses, 18 of which found a teammate, as Ferguson’s former first -team coach René Meulensteen left Old Trafford with a point. Manchester United had already exited the FA Cup at the third round to Swansea City and, having made the semi-finals, were knocked out of the League Cup on penalties to Sunderland. They had won their Champions League Group and were about to play Olympiacos in the Round of 16 before being knocked out by Bayern Munich in the Quarter-Finals. Their only piece of silverware of the season was the 2013 Community Shield beating Wigan Athletic. 

On 20th February 2020 Liverpool played their 25th league match of the 2020/21 season losing 2-0 at home to Everton. This was their fourth defeat in a row. They are sixth in the league. They already have been knocked out of the FA Cup by Manchester United in the fourth round and out of the League Cup by Arsenal, also in the fourth round. Like Manchester United, they won their Champions League group yet look far from the favourites for the competition. They also lost the 2020 Community Shield to Arsenal. 

Liverpool have won fewer matches and conceded more than Moyes’s United. They have managed more goals and fewer defeats but the end result is 40 points from 25 matches compared to Moyses’s 41 from 25 in 2014.

Looking at the drop in quality from the previous season is startling. Moyes was always going to struggle coming in after Sir Alex yet it was still surprising when his United won 21 fewer points after 25 matches than the 2012/13 champions had managed. Liverpool have managed to drop 33 points from the same position last season.

***

Much has been made of Liverpool’s injuries and the strange circumstances of the pandemic. True, Jurgen Klopp’s choice of a thin squad has backfired yet in many ways this drop in quality was predictable. As I’ve already written Liverpool outperformed their expected points last season by nearly 25. 14 of their 32 wins were by a single goal. After 25 matches last season Liverpool were outperforming their expected points by 20.41 points. 

In comparison, this season they would be expected only 3.99 more points than they’ve achieved. In other words whilst they were overperforming by 20.41 points they are only slightly underperforming this time around. Unfortunately, the data for the 2013/14 season is not available to compare. Regression to the mean was to be expected and we are seeing it now. Their 7–2 defeat to Aston Villa was due to be the biggest away defeat of the season until United beat Southampton 9–0. Regression to the mean was to be expected and we are seeing it now. Their 7-2 defeat to Aston Villa was due to be the biggest away defeat of the season until United beat Southampton 9-0. 

Liverpool are now 19 points from the summit of the Premier League. Their championship defence now ranks along with Moyse. Klopp has already conceded the title. He has experienced tremendous tragedy in recent months which must be putting a lot of his team’s travails into perspective and deserves immense sympathy. Maybe he’ll take a break soon. His Dortmund side of 2014/15 serves as a warning. Whilst it would be fanciful to see his Liverpool fighting relegation it is possible that there is more gas in this explosion. 

Reasons to be Cheerful if You're Not a Liverpool Fan: how the champions overachieved and may not be as good as we think

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30 years of hurt are over.  Blackburn Rovers and Leicester City have been knocked off their effing perches.  Liverpool have their first Premier League title.  In case you were in any doubt: This Matters More and You’ll Never Walk Alone. (Unless you’re the staff they attempted to furlough or Liverpool Women neglected to their fate).

There have been and will continue to be plenty of puff pieces on this subject.  The world according to Steve McManaman or Jim Beglin.  Where Anfield is home to special fans who know football better than others who support a club with history; because no other club has passionate fans or history.  A world where Michael Owen is suddenly a Liverpool fan again and thinks that the highest point of Atletico Madrid’s existence was winning on Merseyside.  A world where a recent BBC programme chronicled Liverpool’s title charge as an almost biblical mission.   

And so with a snort of derision I find myself wondering: are Liverpool actually THAT good? Yes, I’m a Manchester United fan and yes, this is (slightly) tongue in cheek but are they?

There was once a role within the Catholic Church to provide evidence against the canonisation of a candidate.  The advocatus diaboli or ‘Devil’s Advocate’ would seek out holes in the argument to award sainthood.  Consider this playing (red) devil’s advocate against the imperious reputation of Liverpool this season.  Before you accuse me: yes, of course I’m bitter.  Liverpool won the Premier League at a canter and, rightly, won plaudits.  However, I’m going to put their season under some scrutiny and use data to answer the question: Are there reasons to be cheerful if you’re not a Liverpool fan looking ahead to next season?  Is there a chance they won’t retain the title?

A glance at the 2019-20 Premier League table is impressive.  There’s Liverpool on 99 points; 18 clear of Manchester City.  Only once before had a club won the league with more points.  Surely there is no questioning their dominance?  Enter statistics.  

Whilst VAR hogs most discussions regarding recent updates to the world of football, for me Expected Goals (EG) has been a far more interesting and illuminating way of looking at the game.  It’s a simple piece of data with far reaching potential.  Each chance at goal is given a numerical value, or xG, between 0-1.  This value basically reflects how hard or easy that chance is.  A shot with an xG of 0.5 means it would be scored 50% of the time.  A shot with an xG of 0.9 would be scored 90% of the time.  And so on.  This BBC Sport article goes into depth about how each chance is awarded a value but, essentially, the closer you are to the goal and the ‘easier’ the shot the higher the xG.  

If you think about it this has the chance to revolutionise how we look at football.  Rather than simply measuring a striker’s quality by goals scored we can look at their xG: do they match their xG (score as many as they should based on difficulty of the chance) or do they exceed or even fall under it?  The same principle works on a defence.  Say a team concedes a lot of shots on goal, we might be tempted to think their defence was poor.  However, they may be employing a low block and, as a result, concede a lot of long shots which count as a shot on goal but have a low xG.  This would give that team a low EG against and more accurately reflect how well they were defending. 

If we can calculate the EG scored (xGs) and EG against (xGa) for both teams during a match we can calculate the result that statistically ‘should’ have happened.  

For example, Liverpool started the 2019-20 season with a 4-1 thrashing of newly promoted Norwich City.  The EGs for both teams was 2.23 for Liverpool and 0.43 for Norwich City.  So, actually both teams scored more than their EG suggests but the result would still have been a Liverpool win.  

Their next match was a 2-1 win away at Southampton.  A statement of intent.  Looking again at the EG and we are given a score of 2.14 - 1.52 in Southampton’s favour.  According to statistics Liverpool should not have won this match.  Not surprising when you might remember this match contained Danny Ings’s horror miss from a few yards out.  

On September 22nd they racked up their sixth straight win away at Stamford Bridge.  However EG shows that rather than a 2-1 away win the chances created would indicate a score of 1.23 to 1.03 in Chelsea’s favour.  

By November 10th Liverpool looked like champions elect already with a 3-1 win against defending champions Manchester City at Anfield 3-1.  The EG score? 1.33 - 1.48.  Another win that shouldn’t have been.

Through the EGs for each match we can then calculate the Expected Points (EP) that team ‘should’ have acquired based on the chances they were making and conceding during the season.  As you may have guessed, looking at Liverpool’s EP tells an interesting story.

Here’s the final 2019-2020 table as it was:

Here it is based on EP:

Liverpool outperformed their EP by 24.72.  They scored 9.81 goals more and conceded 6.57 fewer than their xGs and xGa would suggest.  Based on EP they should have been second,  12 points behind Manchester City and only 4 above Manchester United in 4th.  

As I said before the game isn’t played on the pitch so there’s obviously going to be some discrepancy and teams will over-perform to some extent.  To see the biggest ‘overachievers’ in the 2019-20 Premier League season I subtracted EP from actual points.  This is the top five:

Liverpool overachieved more than any other club, double the degree of Newcastle United, who came second in this table.  I think we’d all agree that Steve Bruce did good work at Newcastle United but based on EP his team would have been relegated at the rock bottom.  What does that say about Liverpool?  OK, maybe this was a fluke and Liverpool were simply on a roll this season. Let’s look at 2018-19; the season where Liverpool lost only once, won 97 points and finished second.  Here’s the top four as it finished:

Incredibly, Liverpool outperformed their EP by 13.55.  Once again they were the highest overachievers.  In 2017-2018 the highest overachievers were Jose Mourinho’s Manchester United who finished second but should have finished sixth.  And we know how that played out.


So, over the course of 2 seasons, Liverpool have outperformed their EP by a staggering 38.72 points.  This is obviously commendable but is it sustainable? The received wisdom was that Leicester City’s fairy story in 2016 was a one-off and so it came to pass.  However, they only exceeded their EP by 12.06.  By comparison, in winning the Bundesliga Bayern Munich exceeded their EP by only 4.67 in 2020 and actually should have had 4 more points in 2019. Manchester City in their disaster of a season should have won the league this year.


Why the discrepancy?  How did Liverpool finish 18 points ahead of Manchester City when they should have been 12 behind? Of their 32 wins, 14 (44.75%) were by one goal.  In comparison in 2018/19 only 9 (28.125%) of Manchester City’s wins were by one goal.  Manchester City outperformed Liverpool by 17 goals scored and only conceded 2 goals more.  But they lost 9 games to Liverpool’s 3.  5 of those defeats were by only one goal.  These are the margins behind the story of the 2019-20 season.   A compelling story but not one which should make the chasing pack terrified for the new season.

So how have Liverpool been able to exceed EP and beat the model?  There’s been a bit of talk about this and in my opinion, this is the real question which needs answering and isn’t amongst all the plaudits.  Of course, Liverpool played very well but they only have the player of the season if you’ve never heard of Kevin de Bruyne.  The number of one-goal wins and their xGa suggests they own a lot more to Alisson than any other player.  Of course, it’s not a bad thing to have a good goalkeeper: in fact, it’s essential.  We don’t know whether if Liverpool did concede more they wouldn’t have just gone up the other end and scored more rather than seeing a match out.  But we can only look at the data we have.

There is lots of discussion about Liverpool’s style of play and their manager’s tactical acumen.  To my mind as long as Pep Guardiola resides on these shores I’d argue that Klopp could only be second in the list of most interesting tacticians in the Premier League.  Now Marcelo Bielsa will be plying his trade in the top flight Jurgen is third at best. Maybe the over-performance of Liverpool over the past two seasons shows us that this is not where his strengths lie: rather it is about eking out consistency from his players as well as managing situations within a game.  An emotive coach, it was inevitable that he would work at Liverpool: an emotive club.  Perhaps only Diego Simeone embodies the very persona of his team in a greater way than Klopp does.

Klopp has shown how he is the master of managing situations and matches.  His Champions League triumph in 2019 owed much to managing moments: a knockout round place earned thanks to a 1-0 win against a sleepy Napoli with Arkadiusz Milik hitting an injury-time chance straight at Alisson; a buoyant semi-final against a Barcelona so emotionally fragile they were capable of throwing away a 3-0 lead; a final facing a broken Spurs team which lasted all of two minutes until a dubious penalty was awarded.  They managed the match at 1-0 and scored a late second.

In 2019-20 Klopp then brought this to their league form: securing single goal margins and seeing a game out.  This would put him at the pinnacle of the psychological aspect of the game.  Gareth Southgate has done much with England to help them manage high pressure situations as well as using emotions for advantage.  Ole Gunnar Solskjaer at Manchester United, Frank Lampard at Chelsea, Zinedine Zidane at Real Madrid and now Andrea Pirlo at Juventus are all appointments based on emotions. Perhaps their records as players speak more to modern players than tacticians like Jose Mourinho, Rafael Benitez or Maurizio Sarri, coaches with no playing career to speak of.  In a game of high-profile moments with season-defining jeopardy, maybe Jurgen Klopp has turned owning the match into an art.  Maybe that is where his plaudits should actually lie. 

Jurgen Klopp is a fascinating character.  The general image is of him laughing and joking yet some had a certain Portuguese manager screamed at a linesman, run onto a pitch, criticised the tactics of Manchester United in the league and Atlético Madrid, played a youth team in the League Cup and refused to attend a FA Cup match it is tempting to wonder if the press would remain as positive.  He’s winning now and it is easy to be nice when you’re winning.  Yet his final season at Borussia Dortmund should serve as a warning.  At Christmas, the club he had won two titles with and taken to the Champions League final were in the relegation zone.  He took them back up to the Europa League places before resigning. Perhaps when the power to control moments slips so too do the results.  Maybe this is the downside of an emotive coach at an emotive club.  The first match of the 2020-21 season against Leeds United may be instructive.

Of course, in order for Liverpool to lose the title, someone else has to win it.  Arsenal, Chelsea and Manchester United are all in decent places.  Mikel Arteta is showing promise, Chelsea are assembling an intriguing squad and Manchester United have their most entertaining group of attacking players since the days of Sir Alex.  Yet it is hard to see any of them taking the title just yet.  Although based on EP Chelsea and Manchester United were much closer to Liverpool than the table would tell us and should be encouraged. The favourite to stop Liverpool remains Pep Guardiola, though.

Guardiola is entering his first fifth season at a club. This is uncharted territory.  Yet the manager who turns diligence to obsession will want to win back the league.  And it is closer than you think  Turn those 5 single goal defeats to draws and that 18 point gap becomes 8. If 4 of Liverpool’s 14 single goal wins become draws and that 18 point gap is gone.

Finally, this is not an era of eras.  Since 2009 only one club has retained the Premier League. For several of those campaigns such as Manchester United in 2013-14, Manchester City in 2014-15 and 2019-20; Chelsea in 2015-16 and 2017-18 and Leicester in 2016-17 title defences were non-existent.  Jurgen Klopp did retain the Bundesliga once with Borussia Dortmund but then failed to match Bayern Munich.  He would do well to not slip into hubris.  To look at the data and perhaps reflect on how this league title was won.  And how it might be taken off him far easier than we might think.